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Several macroeconomic missteps such as global imbalance have 
been blamed for causing the current international financial crisis. 
Others have also blamed the excessive Wall Street greed for the 
crisis. While the above factors may have played a supporting role 
in the financial crisis, they were certainly not the primary causes 
of the crisis. The root cause of the current international financial 
crisis is the abuse of various innovative financial techniques and 
new investment instruments that have been developed. In recent 
decades, the pace of financial innovations has accelerated precipi- 
tously, which in turn has driven the explosive growth in both the 
size of global financial markets and its array of new financial 
products and techniques. The current crisis is primarily the direct 
result of the abuse of some of the latest and most innovative 
financial techniques, most of which are too esoteric and technical 
to be comprehended correctly by both government regulators and 
academic economists. Many crises are usually a byproduct of the 
cycle of financial innovations.
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I. Introduction
The sign of the current global financial crisis first emerged publicly 
in the summer of 2007, when two German banks, IKB and SachsenLB, 
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that had invested heavily in subprime mortgage-related securities via 
their off-balance sheet vehicles, had to be bailed out by the government 
in August 2007. Then, the crisis spread to Great Britain the following 
month, when long queues formed outside Northern Rock, Britain’s fifth 
largest mortgage lender, showcasing the first bank run in the country 
in 150 years. By early 2008, giant banking institutions in Wall Street 
and Europe also announced huge write-offs related to the crisis, 
resulting in the forced takeover by JPMorgan Chase in March 2008 of 
Bear Stearns, the fifth largest investment bank in the United States.
The crisis has affected not just giant banking and financial 
institutions in the West. Even small towns such as Narvik in Arctic 
Norway and some obscure municipalities in Australia lost their precious 
savings and had to come up with emergency funding to keep their 
towns in operations. State of Florida discovered that its state invest- 
ment fund lost almost half of its $27 billion assets within two weeks 
and had to temporarily suspend further withdrawals from the fund, 
and some feared that many Florida counties and municipalities would 
not have enough cash to pay teachers and trash collectors in coming 
months. A similar problem was faced by State of Maine, whose 
investments suffered big losses due to the current crisis. The Indiana 
Children’s Wish Fund, which grants wishes to children with life- 
threatening illnesses, was affected when some of its fund’s investments 
suffered a heavy loss as well.
The international financial crisis and the resulting credit squeeze has 
also reached Asian countries such as Korea, where in November, 2007, 
after almost four months from the outbreak of the crisis in the 
summer, the drastically tightened credit market forced the Bank of 
Korea to inject emergency funding into the market and many Korean 
banks found themselves desperate to obtain necessary funds. The 
common thread linking Arctic Norwegian towns to the state treasuries 
of Florida and Maine and stretching from regional banks in Germany 
and Britain to commercial banks in Korea to the mightiest names on 
Wall Street in a chain of misery is the current global financial crisis 
first triggered by the meltdown in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. 
The unprecedented global financial crisis has then eventually pushed 
the global economy into the most severe crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Total global losses in the current financial 
crisis are estimated at $40 trillion, equivalent to more than two-thirds 
of last year’s world GDP, including the loss of $35 trillion in publicly 
traded corporate equities and $5 trillion in home equity and unincor- 
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porated or privately listed businesses.1 According to the IMF, global 
credit losses are estimated at $4 trillion, 3/4 of which are borne by 
banks and the rest by non-bank investors.
II. Major Differences from Previous Financial Crises 
During the past several hundred years when financial markets have 
existed, there have been numerous financial crises, some of which are 
the stuff of legend, such as the tulip boom-and-bust of 1637 in 
Holland and the 1720 South Sea bubble. However, it was the 20
th 
century that witnessed the most dazzling array of financial crises like 
the U.S. financial panic of 1907 and the stock market crash of 1929. 
The introduction of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and 
the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank in the immediate 
post-World War II era gave rise to a relatively calm period as far as 
international financial crises were concerned. Only after the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s have we witnessed the 
reemergence of international financial crises, such as the oil money 
crises of 1973 and 1979, the LDC foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, the 
Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
Russian financial crisis of 1998, the Ecuadorian financial crisis of 
1999, and the Argentine financial crisis of 2001.
The previous international financial crises during the past 35 years 
after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system were mostly triggered 
in the developing countries, which then spread to the global financial 
markets eventually. In contrast, the current international financial 
crisis was triggered in an industrialized country, specifically in the 
subprime mortgage loan market in the United States. Unlike the earlier 
crises when the main adverse impact was felt first in developing 
countries, the current crisis has troubled first the financial institutions 
both mighty and small and their investors in industrialized countries.
Furthermore, the main causes of earlier crises were macroeconomic 
in nature, such as runaway budget deficits, chronic current account 
deficits and excessive government debts including foreign debts, all 
symptoms of economic mismanagement usually by the governments of 
developing countries. In contrast, the current crisis was less due to 
any deliberate macroeconomic mismanagement by the U.S. or other 
1 Alan Greenspan, “Equities Show Us the Way to a Recovery.” The Financial 
Times, March 30, 2009.
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industrialized country governments but more a result of abusive opera- 
tional behaviors of numerous financial institutions or other private 
sector entities. In other words, the current crisis was mainly the direct 
result of inappropriate or abusive microeconomic behavior by many of 
the most sophisticated and reputable financial institutions in the 
Western industrialized countries and their investors. Macroeconomic 
missteps played only a supporting role in the current financial crisis, 
as will be discussed later in this paper.
Furthermore, the role of such premier international financial 
institutions as the IMF and the World Bank has been quite different in 
the current crisis. In previous international financial crises that were 
first triggered in developing countries, these international financial 
institutions, especially the IMF, played a prominent and active role to 
resolve the crises. For example, the IMF and the World Bank in 
conjunction with the U.S. Treasury Department were instrumental in 
developing the so-called Washington Consensus in order to cope with 
the LDC debt crisis of the 1980s and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
The Consensus was composed of three pillars of fiscal austerity, 
liberalization and privatization, given the fact that macro-economic 
mismanagement by the affected developing countries was the main 
culprit of such crises.
In contrast, both the IMF and the World Bank have played only a 
minor role in the current crisis. They have been relegated more or less 
to the status of bystanders, as they are keenly aware that the current 
crisis is not so much due to any macroeconomic mismanagement of 
affected countries as the result of abusive market practices of private 
financial institutions and investor groups in most industrialized coun- 
tries, especially the United States.
III. Causes of the Current Crisis
Several macroeconomic missteps have been blamed for causing the 
current global financial crisis. For example, some have argued that the 
global imbalance has been magnified by the prolonged low savings and 
high consumption in the United States, resulting in the accumulation 
of massive foreign exchange reserves in East Asian countries and 
others. These surpluses were promptly recycled back to the United 
States, resulting in the excess liquidity and low yields there that in 
turn encouraged risky investment behaviors among Wall Street bankers. 
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The U.S. Federal Reserve under Chairman Alan Greenspan has also 
been blamed for contributing to a prolonged period of excessive 
liquidity because of its liberal monetary policy in the wake of the 
2000-01 tech-stock collapse and the subsequent 9-11 disaster. Also, 
the root cause of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has been traced by 
some to over-enthusiastic drive by both Democrats and Republicans in 
the Congress to promote home ownership, even among those low- 
income households, by forcing American banks to make mortgage 
loans to poorer neighborhood enacting such laws as the Community 
Reinvestment Act. Others have also blamed the excessive Wall Street 
greed for the crisis, ignoring the fact that the free market capitalism 
has always been operating on the basis of profit motives. Greed in Wall 
Street or even in Main Street has been there all along, but it has not 
always triggered a financial crisis.
While the above factors may have played a supporting role in the 
current global financial crisis, they were certainly not the primary 
causes of the crisis. The root cause of the current international 
financial crisis is the abuse of various innovative financial techniques 
and new investment instruments that have been developed in recent 
decades. The world financial markets have experienced a sharp 
acceleration in the pace of financial innovations over the years. Major 
innovations have emerged in the fields of new financial products, 
funding and investment tools, and trading and risk management 
techniques. Both the richness and complexity of these new financial 
products and techniques bear a testimony to the robust spirit of 
financial innovation that has pervaded international financial markets 
since 1960s. While these innovations have improved the market 
efficiency in general, some of them have been misused and abused by 
a certain group of market participants out of ignorance and/or outright 
greed. 
The modern history of international finance has really been driven by 
a series of innovations. Global financial markets have thrived on the 
wings of the animal spirit of innovations. Financial innovation involves 
more than development and diversification of new borrowing sources. It 
affects the entire range of financial intermediation, both domestic and 
international. In fact, the variety of services offered by financial 
intermediaries has been not only on the asset side but it has also been 
equally impressive on the liability side of their balance sheets. Liability 
management of modern financial institutions has become an important 
part of their integrated approach to financial intermediation.2 
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In recent decades, the pace of financial innovations has accelerated 
precipitously, which in turn has driven the explosive growth in both 
the size of global financial markets and its array of new financial 
products and techniques. As of mid 2008, the worldwide outstanding 
volume of debt securities (cash market instruments) alone stood at $87 
trillion. On the other hand, the total outstanding volume of derivatives 
such as swaps, futures, options and forwards (in terms of their 
notional principal amounts) are estimated at $767 trillion and the daily 
volume of foreign exchange trades is estimated at close to $4 trillion. 
Such a gigantic global financial market, far higher in magnitude than 
the real sector of the global economy with the world GDP of $53 
trillion in 2007, is run by hordes of global financial institutions, many 
of which operate around the clock across the entire 24-hour time 
zones. The old adage of “The sun never sets on the British Empire” is 
now replaced by a new reality of “The sun never sets on the Citibank 
or UBS or Goldman Sachs, etc.”3
However, a careful observer has to conclude that the current crisis is 
primarily the direct result of the abuse of some of the latest and most 
innovative financial techniques, most of which are too esoteric and 
technical to be comprehended correctly by both government regulators 
and academic economists. Many crises are a byproduct of the cycle of 
financial innovations. First, new sophisticated financial products or 
techniques are developed and utilized exclusively among the few early 
innovators to a great advantage. At the second stage, as the innovation 
is copied and spread to a wider circle of market participants, some of 
the participants start to abuse them either out of ignorance or outright 
greed. At this stage, regulatory authorities have not caught up with the 
full implications of the new innovation and there appears a regulatory 
vacuum as far as the new innovative product or technique is 
concerned, which tends to embolden the early abusers to push the 
envelope to an extreme limit. At the next stage, such abusive practices 
are further copied and imitated by a wider circle of market participants, 
resulting in a full-blown crisis. At the final stage, both government 
authorities and general market practitioners start to take corrective 
actions, including introduction of new regulations and new supervisory 
2
Esteban Buljevich and Yoon S. Park, “Project Financing and the Inter- 
national Financial Markets.” Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1999, pp. 
1-18. 
3 In fact, the advertising slogan of Citibank, “Citi never sleeps!” is quite an 
accurate description of today’s global financial institutions.
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tools. By this time, however, the damage has already been done to a 
significant sector of the economy.
IV. Role of Securitization in the Current Crisis
Financial innovations enhanced not only the size and complexity of 
global financial markets but they also have contributed to new ways to 
enhance income for market participants. The seed of the current crisis 
was planted several decades ago when Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA, known as Ginnie Mae) in the United States pioneered 
in 1970 securitization of mortgage loans, by bundling hundreds and 
thousands of long-term mortgage loans into marketable bonds known 
as mortgage-backed securities, or MBS. MBSs are so-called pass- 
through securities, which are new types of bonds whose investors 
retain ownership interest in the collateralized assets, which in this case 
are home mortgage loans. The emergence of the MBS market injected 
new liquidity in the entire mortgage loan industry, as many mortgage 
lenders were able to sell their long-term mortgage loans to Ginnie Mae 
and other Wall Street firms that specialize in pooling and securitizing 
these mortgage loans. In the process, the original mortgage loan 
lenders could then make more new mortgage loans with the fresh cash 
that they obtained by selling the earlier mortgage loans to Ginnie Mae 
and Wall Street bundlers. 
Mortgage loan securitization was given an added impetus when, in 
1983, Federal National Mortgage Association (FMNA, known as Fannie 
Mae) came up with the first collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). 
Unlike MBS, CMOs are so-called pay-through securities where the 
investors of these securities do not have any ownership interest in the 
mortgage loan collaterals but their new securities (CMOs) are serviced 
by the cash flows generated by the collateral assets. In other words, 
while pass-through securities such as MBS are certificates of ownership 
in the collateralized assets such as mortgage loans, pay-through 
securities like CMOs are simply collateralized debt obligations whose 
debt service is provided by the cash flows generated by the collateral 
pool. The added advantage of new securities such as MBS and CMOs 
lies in the fact that they can be issued in different tranches categorized 
by the degrees of risk exposure, with the safest tranche usually 
accorded the highest credit rating of triple-A and the lowest tranche, 
known as the “toxic materials,” normally un-rated due to its high 
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credit risk but carrying high yields.
Securitization soon spread from home mortgage loans to other 
financial assets such as commercial mortgage loans, auto loans, credit 
card receivables, equipment leases, home equity loans, manufacturing 
loans, student loans and others. By early 2007, 53% of all non- 
financial debt in the United States was securitized, compared to only 
28% in 1980. By the end of 2006, the outstanding volume of securi- 
tized instruments in the U.S. alone reached over $9 trillion, composed 
of $7 trillion in MBS and CMOs and $2.1 trillion in other asset-backed 
securities (ABS). The widespread practice of securitization has enriched 
the financial markets all over the world, allowing a number of home- 
owners and other market participants a greater access to lower-cost 
credits that would otherwise have been unavailable. Securitization 
provides a “secondary” market for traditional illiquid bank loans and 
other financial assets, thereby pushing down borrowing costs for 
consumers and companies alike. That is why securitization was called 
“democratization of capital” by Michael Milken, of the junk-bond fame 
at the ill-fated Wall Street firm Drexel Burnham that went bankrupt in 
1990. There have been other systemic gains as well. Subjecting bank 
loans and other debt to valuation by capital markets encourages the 
efficient use of capital, and the broad distribution of credit risk 
through securitization reduces the risk of only few creditors shouldering 
all the credit risk. 
While securitization all over the world has in general made a positive 
contribution to the global financial markets, it has also implanted a 
seed of abuse and misuse. The concept of MBS and CMOs has 
provided major market players such as Wall Street firms and credit 
rating agencies a great opportunity to increase fee income by bundling 
all kinds of debt instruments into various tranches of securities, some 
of whose upper tranches can carry prime credit ratings to satisfy the 
investment requirements of many institutional investors such as pension 
funds and insurance companies, while the lower-rated tranches carrying 
higher yields prove attractive to such risk takers as hedge funds and 
other specialized investors.
V. Abuse and Misuse of Innovations: Subprime Mortgages, 
CDOs, Conduits, SIVs, ABCP
Securitization has become a major source of fee income for those 
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institutions related to its business, such as loan originators (mortgage 
lenders and mortgage brokers), Wall Street firms acting as underwriters 
and placement agents for newly created securities, large commercial 
banks and insurance companies acting as credit enhancers for the 
securitized instruments, credit rating agencies with more ratings 
business, and investors eager to pick up additional yields by obtaining 
exotic new securities. In order to satisfy the growing demand for new 
mortgage loans that have become the most crucial raw materials (i.e., 
collaterals) for the securitization process, originators of mortgage loans 
became bolder and more risk-taking by expanding subprime mortgage 
loans. The subprime market in the United States barely existed ten 
years ago, but it exploded during the three years of 2004-06, growing 
from 6.9% of all residential mortgage loans in 2002 and 7.9% in 2003 
to 18.2% in 2004, 20% in 2005 and 20.6% in 2006. Originally 
subprime loans were either for refinances or debt consolidation, with 
fewer than 5% used for actually buying homes. The role of subprime 
loans in securitization also increased sharply from 9% of newly 
originated securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40% in 2006.4
Six years ago, home purchase loans accounted for only one-third of 
all subprime originations. During the past several years, however, 
subprime lenders relaxed underwriting standards and offered home 
mortgages with almost no down payment, little or no documented 
evidence of the borrower’s ability to pay, adjustable-rate mortgages with 
built-in large increases in the monthly payment after initial few years, 
etc. Some of them are called ninja (no income, no job and no assets) 
loans. Then, these subprime mortgage loans were sold quickly by the 
loan originators to Wall Street firms eager for any raw materials as 
collaterals for securitization. When several state governments in the 
United States tried to enact laws limiting abusive practices in mortgage 
lending during the housing boom, the subprime industry engaged   
in aggressive lobbying to sabotage any such efforts. For example, 
Ameriquest Mortgage Company, one of the nation’s largest subprime 
lenders until 2007, handed out more than $20 million in political 
donations and played a major role in persuading the states of New 
Jersey and Georgia to relax tough new laws.5
4 Danielle DiMartino and John Duca, “The Rise and Fall of Subprime 
Mortgages.” Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 2007.
5 The Wall Street Journal, “Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted Mortgage Mess.” 
December 31, 2007a.
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While mortgage loans have been the traditional raw materials (i.e., 
collaterals) for MBS and CMOs, the securitization industry, ever 
hungry for more business, launched in late 1990s collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) whose collaterals are not just new mortgage loans 
but also already existing MBS, CMOs, ABS backed by mobile home 
loans, car loans, airplane leases and credit card receivables, as well as 
other CDOs and even derivatives linked to these mortgage securities 
known as credit default swaps or CDS. The main advantage of such 
CDOs over conventional MBS or CMOs is that they do not need a 
supply of new mortgage loans, since their raw materials (collaterals) 
need not be confined to new mortgage loans as in the case of MBS and 
CMOs. Thus, the banking industry was able to create a brand new 
category of securities in the form of CDOs utilizing as collaterals 
existing securitized instruments or even derivatives linked to them, 
while in the process making huge sums of additional fee income. 
Investment banks underwriting CDOs earned typical fees of 2.5% to 
3.5%, implying as much as $35 million income for a typical $1 billion 
CDO issue. For example, Merrill Lynch launched almost $150 billon 
worth of CDOs during the four-year period of 2004-07, earning over $5 
billion in fee income.
Rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s were 
unseemly accommodating in rating of these CDOs. For example, a $1.5 
billon CDO issue called Norma was marketed by Merrill Lynch in 
March 2007, whose collateral was composed of other securities and 
derivatives with average BBB ratings. But 75% of Norma CDOs was 
rated the highest triple-A by all three rating agencies of Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings and all but the bottom 11% out 
of $1.5 billion was rated A or above. Norma’s generous rating, typical 
of other CDOs issued in their heyday, resulted from a risk 
management model looking backward only to a time period when rising 
house prices and easy credit had kept defaults on subprime mortgage 
loans unusually low, and even though Fitch cited growing concern 
about the subprime mortgage business and the high number of 
borrowers who obtained loans without proof of income. Barely eight 
months after Norma’s launch, however, all the Norma CDOs were 
downgraded in November 2007 to well below the junk bond level at 
single-B or below. In late 2007 and early 2008 when the credit market 
crisis has deepened, rating agencies have downgraded hundreds of 
CDOs and other securitized instruments in their belated recognition of 
the inherent risks of such securities.
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TABLE 1
ACTUAL BOND MARKET YIELDS AT THE TIME OF NORMA CDO ISSUE





AAA bonds (75%) 5.30% 1.20% $13.50 million
AA bonds (9%) 5.66 0.84 1.14
A bonds (5%) 5.84 0.66 0.49
BBB bonds (7.7%) 6.27 0.23 0.26
Unrated bonds (3.3%)
Total additional interest income  $15.39 million
CDOs were also highly lucrative to investors, since CDOs offered 
comparatively high returns. For example, when Norma CDOs were 
issued in March 2007, their yields were much higher than comparably 
rated corporate bonds. Such a yield enhancement was made possible 
through the magic combination of “tranching” and ratings inflation. We 
can illustrate this magic with the example of Norma CDOs, which were 
created with the collaterals carrying average triple-B credit ratings and 
average yields of 6.5%, which was already higher than the comparable 
triple-B corporate bond yield of 6.27% at that time due to tranching of 
the collateral securities. Out of $1.5 billion Norma CDOs, the lowest 
tranche of 3.3% ($50 million) was un-rated and the next lowest 
tranche of 7.7% ($115 million) was rated triple-B, the same credit 
rating as carried by the entire $1.5 billion collaterals. The remaining 
tranches were all assigned credit ratings higher than triple-B. The 
highest tranche of triple-A accounted for 75% ($1,125 million) and the 
remaining 14% tranche ($210 million) was rated either double-A or 
single-A. This meant that 89% of the Norma CDOs were assigned 
credit ratings higher than the triple-B, even though their raw materials 
(collaterals) carried only the triple-B ratings. 
Since those upper-tranche CDOs (accounting for 89% of the entire 
Norma CDOs), which were assigned ratings higher than triple-B, would 
be carrying a yield much lower than 6.5% generated by the entire $1.5 
billion collaterals due to their credit ratings higher than triple-B, as a 
result those investors in all categories of Norma CDO tranches could 
then be offered a yield much higher than comparably-rated corporate 
bonds by distributing the excess returns made possible by the ratings 
inflation, as the above Table 1 illustrates.
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This surplus interest income of $15.39 million per year could be 
distributed among all tranches of Norma CDOs. Let us assume that 
the unrated Norma CDOs (3.3% of the total Norma CDOs or $50 
million) would be paid generous 15% ($7.5 million). The remaining 
$7.9 million could then be distributed among all other Norma CDOs, 
which would result in an extra yield of 0.54% over the comparably 
rated corporate bonds.
This is the magic of tranching in the creation of CDOs, and this 
magic has been made possible by the ratings inflation that somehow 
converted the average triple-B collaterals into mostly (89%) triple-A and 
other higher-rated CDOs. Such magic is equivalent to converting 
instantly a class of 100 students with average B grades into a new 
class of 89 students with A+ or A grades, with only 8 students with B 
grades and 3 students with C grades. In a sense, CDOs have turned 
into a modern version of Middle Age alchemy that tried to turn lead 
into gold. However, just like the Middle Age alchemists who in the end 
failed to convert lead into gold, the modern Wall Street alchemists also 
saw their supposed new gold (triple-A rated CDOs created out of 
triple-B rated collaterals) being down-graded to junk bond quality or 
worse in a couple of years, if not in months.
The rationale for such ratings inflation by the ratings agencies is the 
following: since the historical average default rate of long-term bonds 
carrying triple-B is below 1.25%, setting aside 3.3% of the entire 
tranche as un-rated would more than adequately satisfy any probable 
default risks inherent in the triple-B rated collaterals. Furthermore, the 
next-lowest tranche of 7.7% of Norma CDOs with triple-B rating could 
fully and adequately safeguard complete debt servicing of the 
remaining tranches of 89%, so the upper tranches beyond the triple-B 
tranche of 7.7% would deserve triple-A and other higher credit ratings. 
Financial innovations can indeed be sweet for those practitioners. As a 
result, the volume of CDOs expanded explosively over the ten-year 
period of 1997-2006 from $300 billion to almost $2 trillion.6
In their heydays, CDOs were the investment of choice for numerous 
asset managers and investors, since they carried both sterling credit 
ratings and excellent yields much higher than comparably rated 
corporate bonds. During the period after the 9/11 of the relatively low 
6
Anthony Sanders, “CDO Market Implosion and the Pricing of Subprime 
Mortgage-Backed Securities.” a draft paper presented at a George Washington 
University Finance Seminar, February 2009.
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interest rate and excess liquidity, there appeared intense competition 
globally for extra yield. Higher investment returns led to more success 
for the investment managers around the world. In 2006, for example, a 
Credit Suisse money market fund achieved an investment yield just 31 
basis points (0.31%) higher than the industry average. As a result, the 
fund size increased 26 folds from $1 billion to $26 billion in just six 
months! Therefore, it is not surprising that asset managers were eager 
to search out those securities of high credit ratings and high yields, 
which were rare combinations indeed but were available “luckily” in the 
form of CDOs. They were the perfect investments of choice among 
asset managers hungry for higher yields to stay competitive. CDOs 
were eagerly bought by the investors around the world, such as 
pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, commercial and investment 
banks, including some of the largest and most sophisticated financial 
institutions. Citibank, UBS, Hongkong Shanghai Bank, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and BOA were some of the major investors of CDOs. Many of 
CDO underwriters such as Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bear 
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers also bought into higher-tranche CDOs 
for their own portfolios, since CDOs carried excellent credit ratings and 
at the same time provided the yields higher than comparably rated 
corporate bonds.
Credit ratings are a public good, and many institutional investors 
such as pension funds and insurance companies are limited to 
investing in only those securities rated double-A or above. Thus, the 
seal of approval by rating agencies is an important signal to the 
financial market participants. Nevertheless, the credit rating environ- 
ment for securitized instruments such as MBS, CMOs, and CDOs 
(known as “structured finance products”) has been fecund with 
conflicts of interest for rating agencies. The securitization mania is 
based on obtaining satisfactory ratings, and credit rating agencies were 
usually consulted by Wall Street underwriting firms, before the 
issuance of the securities, on how to structure the deal in order to 
obtain satisfactory ratings in the first place. Rating agencies are also 
paid after the securities are successfully issued. Thus, almost an 
incestual relationship emerged between major Wall Street investment 
banks and credit rating agencies. Such partnership has also been very 
lucrative to rating agencies. For example, Moody’s net income more 
than doubled from $289 million in 2003 to $754 million in 2006 as 
securitization expanded rapidly.
Such high returns on CDOs triggered further risky ventures in the 
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form of conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). Large 
commercial banks set up conduits as separate legal entities, which 
then issued short-term commercial paper backed by such collaterals as 
auto loans and leases, equipment leases, corporate loans, and eventually 
mortgage loans or MBS or CMOs. The cost of issuing short-term 
assets-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is very low due to its short- 
term maturity, and conduits in turn invested the low-cost funds thus 
raised in the higher-yielding long-term MBS or CMOs and later even 
more lucrative CDOs. Conduits were “off balance-sheet vehicles” that 
allowed the sponsoring banks to be exposed to complex and lucrative 
bonds without requiring them to hold capital reserves against these 
assets as these assets belonged technically and legally to conduits 
which are separate legal entities. At their peak, the combined assets of 
conduits stood at $1.4 trillion in the middle of 2007.
Then, large banks went a step further by setting up SIVs. Unlike 
conduits that have full credit back-up facilities from the sponsoring 
banks, SIVs do not always have to carry a full credit backup from the 
sponsoring banks. Some SIVs have some partial backup facilities from 
sponsoring banks known as “liquidity puts” and some do not. But just 
like conduits, SIV assets would stay off the sponsoring bank’s balance 
sheet and the sponsor bank would profit by collecting fees managing 
the SIV. From the late 1980s when the first SIV was launched by 
Citigroup, a number of SIVs have been created by banking giants such 
as Citigroup and HSBC as well as by some less well-known banks 
such as Germany’s IKB and SachsenLB that were mentioned earlier, 
and their combined total assets stood at $400 billion as of summer 
2007, when they peaked. Of this amount, almost one quarter of SIV 
assets belonged to those affiliated with Citigroup. There were even 
some SIV-lites that specialized in a high degree of leverage by borrowing 
up to 40 to 70 times their equity and then investing the funds in 
highly lucrative but risky subprime CDOs.
Until the summer of 2007, both conduits and SIVs relied heavily on 
the ABCP market, whose outstanding volume peaked at $1.2 trillion. 
However, as the U.S. subprime sector started to crumble, investors 
shied away from ABCP, thus triggering funding scares among conduits 
and SIVs. If they could not renew their maturing ABCP, they would be 
forced to dump their assets composed mostly of CDOs and other high- 
risk securities whose secondary market was disappearing fast. With the 
blessing of the U.S. Treasury, therefore, large banks led by Citigroup, 
Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase tried to sep up a Super SIV in 
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late 2007 in order to purchase assets from distressed SIVs and 
conduits for the purpose of preventing massive dumping of assets by 
SIVs in the secondary market. But other banks were reluctant to join 
in the desperate rescue efforts and the Super SIV idea was finally 
abandoned. Instead, many sponsoring banks have started to bail out 
their affiliate SIVs by directly taking over their assets onto their own 
balance sheets or by extending full credit backing to them, thus 
effectively forcing the sponsor banks to move these assets on the book 
instead of hiding them off the book. Such market-based solution was 
the right though painful way to go, since the sponsor banks had to 
own up to their moral and reputational obligation to their affiliate 
conduits and SIVs.
VI. Two Phases of the Current Financial Crisis
The current financial crisis first emerged in mid 2007 as the 
subprime mortgage crisis, as the U.S. housing bubble burst in early 
2007, resulting in sharp decline in the market value of various 
securities such as MBS, CMOs, and CDOs. This first phase also 
witnessed the bailout of some of the financial institutions heavily 
exposed to these investments, such as IKB, SachsenLB, Northern Rock, 
and Bear Stearns. This first phase of the crisis climaxed with the 
government bailout of the two premier U.S. mortgage finance institu- 
tions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on September 7, 2008. These two 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) were actually private com- 
panies but they were originally established with the sponsorship of the 
U.S. Congress to promote housing finance in America. As GSEs, their 
debt securities enjoyed the highest credit ratings as the market always 
assumed that the government would not let them fail. Apart from their 
unique status as GSEs, they were considered just too big to fail with 
total assets of almost $1 trillion each. Therefore, when the government 
finally bailed them out in mid September 2008, the global financial 
market was not surprised.
However, there were loud public and political outrages at the 
government bailing out these powerful and historically profitable private 
companies with taxpayers’ money. Along with the March 2008 bailout 
of Bear Stearns through the government-arranged merger with JPMorgan 
Chase at the potential government liability of about $30 billion, the 
public criticism of the government bailing out “rich greedy Wall Street 
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firms” stung the Bush administration. Thus, a week later on September 
15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers needed a bailout, the Bush adminis- 
tration decided not to bail it out and instead let it go bankrupt. 
Lehman Brothers, with $700 billion total assets and $740 billion in 
outstanding derivative contracts with over 5,000 counterparties around 
the world, was the fourth largest investment bank in America. Until 
that time, it had been widely assumed in the financial market that any 
U.S. financial institution belonging in the top ten would be considered 
so-called TBTF (too-big-to-fail) banks. For example, in 1984 Continental 
Illinois Bank was the 7
th largest bank in the United States with $45 
billion total assets and the government decided to bail it out at that 
time.
At the time of its bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers was the fourth 
largest investment bank with total assets more than 15 times that of 
Continental Illinois, not to speak of its even bigger volume of out- 
standing derivatives contracts. When the Bush administration blinked 
and let Lehman fail on September 15, 2008, all bets were off in the 
global financial markets, which immediately fell into a total chaos 
triggering the second and far more serious phase of the current global 
financial crisis. While the first phase of the crisis mainly involved 
mortgage-related securities such as CDOs and associated institutions 
like SIVs and conduits and their sponsor banks, the second phase 
engulfed the entire range of global financial markets. With the hallowed 
TBTF principle abandoned with the bankruptcy of Lehman, all financial 
institutions both big and small became a fair game for bear attacks. 
Thus, on the same day of Lehman bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was so 
weakened to seek an emergency merger with Bank of America. The 
following day, on September 16, the triple-A rated premier U.S. in- 
surance firm AIG also had to be bailed out. Barely a week later, two 
remaining Wall Street giants, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, 
could not stand the concerted bear attacks and had to become bank 
holding companies, thus ending the 75-year history of U.S. mono-line 
investment banks in Wall Street.
The Lehman bankruptcy also resulted in the wholesale freeze of the 
entire global financial markets. The heart of these markets, the 
Eurocurrency interbank market, immediately got frozen, with the 3- 
month Eurodollar LIBOR (London inter-bank offered rate) shooting up 
from 2.2% to almost 5% in a matter of days, practically stopping any 
inter-bank borrowing. Both the $3.5 trillion money market fund (MMF) 
market and the $1.3 trillion commercial paper market in the United 
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States got totally frozen, preventing companies from accessing these 
crucial short-term funding sources. The government had to rush to 
their rescue by both blanket guarantees of money market funds in 
order to stem wholesale fund withdrawals from MMFs, and the Federal 
Reserve decided on directly purchasing commercial paper.
The most important damage was done to the $58 trillion CDS (credit 
default swaps) market. CDS contracts were originally developed to 
provide credit institutions and investors the hedging tool against their 
credit risks. For example, if BOA provides $100 million 5-year loan to 
Lehman Brothers, it can hedge against the Lehman’s potential loan 
default by purchasing 5-year $100 million CDS on the Lehman credit 
risk from, say, AIG at the price of 150 basis points. BOA then pays 
AIG each year $1.5 million (150 basis points on $100 million), but if 
Lehman Brothers either defaults on its $100 million loan or goes 
bankrupt, BOA can collect $100 million from AIG, who is the seller of 
CDS in this case. Later, however, this useful financial innovation for 
credit risk hedging has turned into speculative tools, as many spec- 
ulators such as hedge funds bought Lehman CDS even without any 
credit exposure to Lehman Brothers in the first place. Bear attacks on 
Lehman can take place if enough speculators started to buy Lehman 
CDS, driving its price from 150 basis points initially to 300 to 500 or 
700 points, making it extremely difficult or even impossible for Lehman 
to get credits from the market, forcing it into bankruptcy. Even if 
Lehman does not go into bankruptcy, early purchaser of Lehman CDS 
at 150 basis points can generate huge profits as Lehman CDS price 
goes up from 150 basis points to 500 or 700 points. As a massive 
seller of CDS to the tune of $500 billion, AIG was especially hurt by its 
excessive exposure to CDS, which provides an asymmetrical risk-reward 
outcome. Sellers of CDS contracts such as AIG are exposed to 
unlimited risk on the downside while guaranteed only limited reward 
on the upside. On the other hand, the risk-reward profile for the 
buyers of CDS such as hedge funds and investors in CDOs is the 
opposite. AIG mispriced its potential risk exposure in a financial crisis, 
and both speculators and counterparties pushed it on the verge of 
bankruptcy on September 16, 2008.
The adverse impact of the global financial crisis has now spread to 
the main street, pushing the global economy into a severe recession. 
Immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy, the U.S. had to adopt a 
financial bailout package of $700 billion, known as TARP (Troubled 
Assets Relief Program), and the governments around the world had to 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS140
come up with ambitious economic stimulus packages, including the 
new Obama administration adopting extra $787 billion fiscal stimulus 
package. 
VII. Government Responses
The current financial market crisis was triggered by the abuse and 
misuse of financial innovations in the environment of greed and 
ignorance. Regulatory authorities were kept in the dark for a long time 
as the market abuse utilized newest financial techniques and 
instruments whose implications were not clear to outside observers 
including regulatory authorities, thus creating a regulatory vacuum. 
When the first signs of crisis emerged with long queues of depositors 
forming in front of Northern Rock offices and with abrupt cutoff of 
credit lines to affected banks such as IKB and SachsenLB, the 
immediate response by governments was to make emergency credit 
lines available to the affected banks.
As the crisis has spread to the all-important interbank market where 
the short-term interbank rates stayed unusually high indicating a 
near-panic credit crunch, central banks around the world have 
aggressively injected funds into the banking system. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) has been especially active, injecting hundreds of 
billion of dollars into the interbank market in mid December, 2007, 
alone. The U.S. Federal Reserve also adopted innovative new techniques 
to supply massive amounts of funds to the banking system and the 
credit markets via direct purchase of commercial paper and mortgage- 
backed securities as well as Treasury bonds. Central banks around the 
world also drastically lowered the base rates to help out in the credit 
crisis. 
For the longer-term horizon, regulatory authorities have embarked 
upon much-needed corrective actions. For example, the Federal Reserve 
has made proposals for new regulations on abusive and deceptive 
mortgage lending that has precipitated the subprime mortgage crisis. 
The proposed reforms fall into three groups. First group is targeted at 
controlling abusive practices in subprime mortgage loans. Second 
group of reforms aims to make the fees and commissions attached to 
subprime mortgages fairer and more transparent. The third group deals 
with the advertising of subprime mortgages.
There is also an increasing demand to tighten regulations and 
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supervision of credit rating agencies. The State of Connecticut issued 
subpoenas to the three major credit rating agencies as part of its 
antitrust investigation. Some experts are advocating separation of 
rating and advising functions of rating agencies, echoing a similar 
movement to separate auditing and consulting services of major CPA 
firms in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy. There seems to be an 
emerging consensus on the need to devise a way to control the obvious 
conflicts of interest that have manifested themselves in the behavior of 
major rating agencies during the recent securitization frenzy.
Some of the abusive practices by major financial institutions are also 
under scrutiny. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has launched enquiry into how financial firms including hedge funds 
and Wall Street investment banks have been pricing their mortgage- 
related and other securitized instruments. Specifically, SEC would like 
to examine whether financial firms should have told investors earlier 
about the declining value of mortgage securities they held and managed 
and how they priced them on their books. Certainly, a more trans- 
parent investment behavior and pricing practices are called for in order 
to protect market participants in such securities.
VIII. Implications for Global Financial Markets
It has been noted that the current global financial crisis is different 
from other previous crises that have affected the international financial 
system during past several decades. The recent abusive behavior of 
many financial institutions is not only the result of greed and ignorance 
but also due to the excess liquidity in the world financial markets and 
the intense competition to enhance the investment returns. In a world 
of low yield due to the excess liquidity in global search of higher 
returns, investment managers have been subject to intense pressure to 
obtain higher yields just to stay competitive. In such an environment, 
a difference of dozen basis points (one hundredth of one percent) in 
investment returns can make a world of difference for the investment 
managers. 
As mentioned earlier, a Credit Suisse money market fund was able to 
achieve in 2006 an investment return on its fund of just 31 basis 
points higher than the industry average. As a result, the size of the 
fund ballooned from $1 billion at the start of 2007 to $26 billion by 
July 2007. As the fund investment yield dipped a little during the 
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following six months, however, the size of the fund was then reduced to 
$10 billion. In such a roller-coaster environment of international 
investment management, many financial institutions are willing to take 
advantage of latest innovative techniques to improve their investment 
performance.
It is no wonder then that both bank conduits and SIVs were able to 
market their ABCP to the tune of $1.2 trillion at its peak, because 
there were so many money market fund managers eager to purchase 
such paper as long as they pay ten or fifteen basis points higher than 
comparable securities. The global financial markets have also created a 
“shadow banking system” apart from the traditional banking system 
which binds banks and clients on an ongoing basis, with the banks 
retaining the client credit risk on their books. In recent decades, 
however, banks have been turned into loan originators, shoveling the 
loans out immediately to other loan packagers and securities under- 
writers. Traditional relationship banking between banks and clients is 
replaced by transactional banking where banks are eager to generate 
as many transactions as possible so that they can off-load them to 
securitization packagers and underwriters.
Some have characterized this transactional banking as “vehicular 
finance” under which banks pass on their loans to new vehicles such 
as conduits and SIVs which then bundle them and dissect them into 
diverse tranches to be sold to investors all over the world, ranging from 
the towns in the Arctic Norway to the municipalities in the backcountry 
of Australia. It is a challenge now facing both regulators and market 
participants how a proper balance can be restored between modern 
finance of globalized innovations and prudent financial risk manage- 
ment.
(Received 12 February 2009; Revised 15 April 2009)
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